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Soapbox method for resolving disagreement by reasoned statement

For varieties of language, run across Dialect. For electrical insulators, see Dielectric.

Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική , dialektikḗ; related to dialogue; German language: Dialektik), likewise known as the dialectical method, is a soapbox between two or more people belongings different points of view about a discipline but wishing to constitute the truth through reasoned argumentation. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such equally emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric.[1] [two] Dialectic may thus be contrasted with both the eristic, which refers to argument that aims to successfully dispute another's argument (rather than searching for truth), and the didactic method, wherein ane side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as small-scale logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.

Within Hegelianism, the word dialectic has the specialised significant of a contradiction between ideas that serves as the determining factor in their relationship. Dialectical materialism, a theory or set of theories produced mainly past Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, adapted the Hegelian dialectic into arguments regarding traditional materialism. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx were criticized in the twentieth century by the philosophers Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.

Dialectic tends to imply a process of development and then does not naturally fit within classical logics, only was given some formalism in the twentieth century. The emphasis on process is specially marked in Hegelian dialectic, and even more so in Marxist dialectical logic, which tried to account for the evolution of ideas over longer time periods in the real globe.

Western dialectical forms [edit]

In that location is a variety of meanings of dialectic or dialectics within Western philosophy.

Classical philosophy [edit]

In classical philosophy, dialectic ( διαλεκτική ) is a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses). The outcome of such a dialectic might be the refutation of a relevant suggestion, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing assertions, or a qualitative improvement of the dialogue.[3] [4]

Moreover, the term "dialectic" owes much of its prestige to its role in the philosophies of Socrates and Plato, in the Greek Classical period (5th to 4th centuries BC). Aristotle said that it was the pre-Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea who invented dialectic, of which the dialogues of Plato are the examples of the Socratic dialectical method.[5]

According to Kant, nonetheless, the ancient Greeks used the word "dialectic" to signify the logic of faux appearance or semblance. To the Ancients, "it was nil but the logic of illusion. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's ignorance, indeed even to 1'southward intentional tricks, the outward appearance of truth, by imitating the thorough, accurate method which logic always requires, and by using its topic as a cloak for every empty assertion."[half dozen]

Socratic method [edit]

The Socratic dialogues are a item grade of dialectic known as the method of elenchus (literally, "refutation, scrutiny"[seven]) whereby a series of questions clarifies a more precise statement of a vague belief, logical consequences of that statement are explored, and a contradiction is discovered. The method is largely subversive, in that imitation conventionalities is exposed[8] and just constructive in that this exposure may lead to further search for truth. The detection of error does not corporeality to a proof of the antonym; for example, a contradiction in the consequences of a definition of piety does not provide a correct definition. The principal aim of Socratic activity may be to ameliorate the soul of the interlocutors, by freeing them from unrecognized errors; or indeed, by teaching them the spirit of research.

In mutual cases, Socrates used enthymemes every bit the foundation of his argument.[ citation needed ]

For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least i thing exists that certain gods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro'south definition of piety is acceptable, then there must be at least 1 thing that is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by the gods)—which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization past this dialectical method that his definition of piety is not sufficiently meaningful.

For example, in Plato'southward Gorgias, dialectic occurs between Socrates, the Sophist Gorgias, and two men, Polus and Callicles. Because Socrates' ultimate goal was to accomplish truthful knowledge, he was fifty-fifty willing to change his ain views in order to arrive at the truth. The fundamental goal of dialectic, in this instance, was to establish a precise definition of the subject field (in this case, rhetoric) and with the use of argumentation and questioning, make the subject fifty-fifty more precise. In the Gorgias, Socrates reaches the truth past request a series of questions and in return, receiving short, clear answers.

Plato [edit]

There is another interpretation of dialectic, suggested in The Republic, equally a procedure that is both discursive and intuitive.[9] In Platonism and Neoplatonism, dialectic assumes an ontological and metaphysical office in that it becomes the process whereby the intellect passes from sensibles to intelligibles, rising from Idea to Idea until it finally grasps the supreme Thought, the First Principle which is the origin of all. The philosopher is consequently a "dialectician".[10] In this sense, dialectic is a procedure of enquiry that does away with hypotheses upwardly to the First Principle (Republic, Vii, 533 c-d). It slowly embraces the multiplicity in unity. Simon Blackburn writes that the dialectic in this sense is used to understand "the full process of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated so as to attain knowledge of the supreme skillful, the Form of the Good".[11]

Aristotle [edit]

Aristotle stresses that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers several formulas to describe this affinity between the two disciplines: showtime of all, rhetoric is said to be a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to dialectic (Rhet. I.1, 1354a1); (ii) it is too called an "outgrowth" (paraphues ti) of dialectic and the study of grapheme (Rhet. I.2, 1356a25f.); finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric is part of dialectic and resembles it (Rhet. I.2, 1356a30f.). In saying that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias (464bff.), where rhetoric is ironically divers as a counterpart to cookery in the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word 'antistrophos' to designate an illustration, information technology is likely that Aristotle wants to express a kind of analogy too: what dialectic is for the (private or bookish) practice of attacking and maintaining an argument, rhetoric is for the (public) practice of defending oneself or accusing an opponent. The illustration to dialectic has of import implications for the status of rhetoric. Plato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric cannot be an art (technê), since it is not related to a definite subject, while real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as e.grand. medicine or shoemaking are defined by their products, i.e., health and shoes.[12]

Medieval philosophy [edit]

Logic, which could be considered to include dialectic, was ane of the 3 liberal arts taught in medieval universities equally part of the trivium; the other elements were rhetoric and grammar.[13] [14] [15] [sixteen]

Based mainly on Aristotle, the first medieval philosopher to work on dialectics was Boethius (480–524).[17] After him, many scholastic philosophers also made use of dialectics in their works, such every bit Abelard,[eighteen] William of Sherwood,[nineteen] Garlandus Compotista,[20] Walter Burley, Roger Swyneshed, William of Ockham,[21] and Thomas Aquinas.[22]

This dialectic (a quaestio disputata) was formed equally follows:

  1. The question to be determined ("It is asked whether...");
  2. A provisory respond to the question ("And it seems that...");
  3. The principal arguments in favor of the provisory answer;
  4. An argument against the provisory answer, traditionally a single statement from authorisation ("On the contrary...");
  5. The determination of the question after weighing the evidence ("I answer that...");
  6. The replies to each of the initial objections. ("To the first, to the 2d etc., I answer that...")

Modern philosophy [edit]

The concept of dialectics was given new life at the showtime of the 19th century by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (following Johann Gottlieb Fichte), whose dialectical model of nature and of history made dialectic a fundamental attribute of the nature of reality (instead of regarding the contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of the dialectical method, as the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant tended to practice in his Critique of Pure Reason).[23] [24]

In the mid-19th century, the concept of dialectics was appropriated past Karl Marx (see, for instance, Das Kapital, published in 1867) and Friedrich Engels and retooled in what they considered to be a nonidealistic manner. It would also become a crucial part of later representations of Marxism as a philosophy of dialectical materialism. These representations oft assorted dramatically[25] and led to vigorous contend among unlike Marxist groupings.

Hegelian dialectic [edit]

Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a threefold manner, was stated past Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus[26] as comprising three dialectical stages of development: a thesis, giving ascension to its reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis; and the tension betwixt the two beingness resolved by means of a synthesis. Although this model is ofttimes named later on Hegel, he never used that specific formulation. Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant.[27] Carrying on Kant'due south piece of work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis model and popularized it.

On the other paw, Hegel did utilize a three-valued logical model that is very similar to the antonym model, but Hegel's near usual terms were: Abstruse-Negative-Concrete. Hegel used this writing model as a courage to accompany his points in many of his works.[28]

The formula, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, does not explicate why the thesis requires an antithesis. Nevertheless, the formula, abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an incompleteness, in any initial thesis—it is too abstract and lacks the negative of trial, error, and experience. For Hegel, the concrete, the synthesis, the absolute, must always pass through the phase of the negative, in the journey to completion, that is, arbitration. This is the essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics.

According to the German language philosopher Walter Kaufmann:

Fichte introduced into German philosophy the 3-stride of thesis, antonym, and synthesis, using these 3 terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never in one case used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they practise not aid us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they impede whatsoever open up-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing information technology into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned [...] The mechanical formalism [...] Hegel derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.[29] [30]

Kaufmann also cites Hegel's criticism of the triad model commonly misattributed to him, adding that "the only place where Hegel uses the three terms together occurs in his lectures on the history of philosophy, on the last folio just one of the sections on Kant—where Hegel roundly reproaches Kant for having 'everywhere posited thesis, antithesis, synthesis'".[31]

To draw the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung, variously translated into English as "sublation" or "overcoming", to conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates preserving the useful portion of an thought, thing, gild, etc., while moving beyond its limitations. (Jacques Derrida's preferred French translation of the term was relever.)[32]

In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Zilch (Nichts). When information technology is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same fourth dimension, also returning to nothing (in life, for example, one's living is besides a dying), both Being and Nothing are united every bit Becoming.[33]

As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major stages of which nautical chart a progression from self-alienation every bit slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational constitutional state of complimentary and equal citizens. The Hegelian dialectic cannot be mechanically practical for whatever chosen thesis. Critics argue that the selection of whatsoever antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used equally the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice, when an antithesis is selected to accommodate the user'south subjective purpose, the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical, non logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the Fichtean "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" model is that information technology implies that contradictions or negations come from outside of things. Hegel's point is that they are inherent in and internal to things. This conception of dialectics derives ultimately from Heraclitus.

Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is "to report things in their own existence and motility and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding."[34]

One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transition from quantity to quality, which he terms the Mensurate. The measure is the qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity.[35]

The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at beginning only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the one paw, the quantitative features of existence may exist altered, without affecting its quality. On the other manus, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. [...] Just if the quantity present in measure exceeds a sure limit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in cessation. This however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at one time occupied by some other. This process of mensurate, which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, so equally a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal (knotted) line.[36]

As an example, Hegel mentions the states of aggregation of water: "Thus the temperature of h2o is, in the first place, a betoken of no consequence in respect of its liquidity: nonetheless with the increase or diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this country of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or water ice".[37] As other examples Hegel mentions the reaching of a signal where a single additional grain makes a heap of wheat; or where the bald tail is produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs.

Some other important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung (sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to some other, but past the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical movement involves 2 moments that negate each other, something and its other. Every bit a result of the negation of the negation, "something becomes its other; this other is itself something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, so on ad infinitum".[38] Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is cocky-related.[39] In becoming there are two moments:[40] cominghoped-for and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, i.east., negation of the negation, being passes over into naught, it ceases to exist, merely something new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one paw ceases to be and is put to an cease, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained.[41] In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; information technology is self-related, then cocky-forgetful, relieving the original tension.

Marxist dialectic [edit]

Marxist dialectic is a course of Hegelian dialectic which applies to the study of historical materialism. It purports to be a reflection of the existent world created by human. Dialectic would thus be a robust method nether which one could examine personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, writing several decades after Hegel'south decease, proposed that Hegel's dialectic is too abstract:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's easily, by no means prevents him from being the get-go to present its full general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel inside the mystical shell.[42]

In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialectic method, which he claims to be "direct opposite" of Hegel'southward method:

My dialectic method is not only unlike from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-procedure of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an contained bailiwick, is the demiurgos of the real globe, and the real earth is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the textile world reflected by the homo mind, and translated into forms of thought.[43]

In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical report became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. In the USSR, under Joseph Stalin, Marxist dialectics became "diamat" (brusk for dialectical materialism), a theory emphasizing the primacy of the material style of life; social "praxis" over all forms of social consciousness; and the secondary, dependent graphic symbol of the "ideal".

The term "dialectical materialism" was coined past the 19th-century social theorist Joseph Dietzgen who used the theory to explicate the nature of socialism and social development. The original populariser of Marxism in Russia, Georgi Plekhanov used the terms "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism" interchangeably. For Lenin, the primary characteristic of Marx'southward "dialectical materialism" (Lenin's term) was its application of materialist philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin's main input in the philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection, which presented human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the objective material world that fully shapes its contents and structure.

Later, Stalin's works on the discipline established a rigid and formalistic segmentation of Marxist–Leninist theory in the dialectical materialism and historical materialism parts. While the first was supposed to be the key method and theory of the philosophy of nature, the second was the Soviet version of the philosophy of history.

A dialectical method was key to Western Marxists such as Karl Korsch and Georg Lukács. Certain members of the Frankfurt Schoolhouse also used dialectical thinking, such as Theodor West. Adorno who adult negative dialectics. Soviet academics, notably Evald Ilyenkov and Zaid Orudzhev, continued pursuing unorthodox philosophic report of Marxist dialectics; also in the West, notably the philosopher Bertell Ollman at New York University.

Friedrich Engels proposed that Nature is dialectical, thus, in Anti-Dühring he said that the negation of negation is:

A very simple process, which is taking identify everywhere and every 24-hour interval, which any child can sympathise as soon every bit it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped past the one-time idealist philosophy.[44]

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels said:

Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality equally mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism volition now declare that it is indeed something quite self-axiomatic, trivial, and commonplace, which they accept long employed, and then they have been taught cipher new. Simply to have formulated for the beginning time in its universally valid form a general law of evolution of Nature, gild, and thought, volition always remain an human action of historic importance.[45]

Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital (Capital), which outlines two central theories: (i) surplus value and (ii) the materialist formulation of history; Marx explains dialectical materialism:

In its rational grade, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same fourth dimension, also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because information technology regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature non less than its momentary being; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.[46]

Class struggle is the chief contradiction to be resolved by Marxist dialectics, because of its primal office in the social and political lives of a society. Nonetheless, Marx and Marxists developed the concept of grade struggle to embrace the dialectical contradictions between mental and transmission labor, and between town and country. Hence, philosophic contradiction is primal to the development of dialectics – the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change; the negation of the initial development of the status quo; the negation of that negation; and the loftier-level recurrence of features of the original status quo.

In the USSR, Progress Publishers issued anthologies of dialectical materialism by Lenin, wherein he also quotes Marx and Engels:

As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of evolution, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered past Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy.... "The great basic thought", Engels writes, "that the world is not to be comprehended as a circuitous of fix-made things, but equally a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away... this great fundamental thought has, peculiarly since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this key thought in words, and to utilize information technology in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are ii different things.... For dialectical philosophy zip is concluding, absolute, sacred. Information technology reveals the transitory grapheme of everything and in everything; zilch can endure earlier information technology, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more the mere reflection of this process in the thinking encephalon." Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the full general laws of move both of the external world and of human thought".[47]

Lenin describes his dialectical agreement of the concept of evolution:

A development that repeats, as information technology were, stages that have already been passed, just repeats them in a different mode, on a higher basis ("the negation of the negation"), a development, then to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or inside a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, 1 that follows definite laws – these are some of the features of dialectics every bit a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional i.[47]

An example of the influence of Marxist dialectic in the European tradition is Jean-Paul Sartre'due south 1960 book Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre stated:

Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in society to observe at that place concrete syntheses. It can excogitate of these syntheses but within a moving, dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural indicate of view adopted hither—'philosophy-condign-the world'.[48]

Dialectical naturalism [edit]

Dialectical naturalism is a term coined by American philosopher Murray Bookchin to describe the philosophical underpinnings of the political program of social ecology. Dialectical naturalism explores the circuitous interrelationship betwixt social problems, and the directly consequences they have on the ecological affect of human order. Bookchin offered dialectical naturalism as a contrast to what he saw as the "empyrean, basically antinaturalistic dialectical idealism" of Hegel, and "the wooden, often scientistic dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxists".

Theological dialectical forms [edit]

Baháʼí dialectics — dialectical science and religion [edit]

Baháʼí Faith doctrine advocates a form of dialectical scientific discipline and faith. A dialectical relationship of harmony between religion and science is presented, wherein science and religion are described as complementary, mutually dependent, and indispensable knowledge systems.[49] Baháʼí scripture asserts that true scientific discipline and truthful faith can never be in conflict. 'Abdu'l-Bahá, the son of the founder of the religion, stated that religion without science is superstition and that science without organized religion is materialism. He also admonished that true religion must conform to the conclusions of scientific discipline.[50] [51] [52] As a modern, globalist organized religion, the Baháʼí Organized religion defies uncomplicated categorisation into any of Western, Eastern, Northern, Southern, or other philosophical forms. Nevertheless, the principled dialectical approach to harmony between science and religion is not unlike social environmental's implementation of dialectical naturalism to moderate the extremes of scientifically unverified idealisms with scientific insight.

Dialectical theology [edit]

Neo-orthodoxy, in Europe also known as theology of crunch and dialectical theology,[53] [54] is an approach to theology in Protestantism that was adult in the aftermath of the First World War (1914–1918). It is characterized equally a reaction against doctrines of 19th-century liberal theology and a more positive reevaluation of the teachings of the Reformation, much of which had been in reject (especially in western Europe) since the belatedly 18th century.[55] It is primarily associated with 2 Swiss professors and pastors, Karl Barth[56] (1886–1968) and Emil Brunner (1899–1966),[53] [54] even though Barth himself expressed his unease in the use of the term.[57]

In dialectical theology the difference and opposition between God and man beings is stressed in such a way that all homo attempts at overcoming this opposition through moral, religious or philosophical idealism must be characterized as 'sin'. In the decease of Christ humanity is negated and overcome, but this judgment also points frontwards to the resurrection in which humanity is reestablished in Christ. For Barth this meant that only through God'due south 'no' to everything human tin can his 'yes' be perceived. Applied to traditional themes of Protestant theology, such as double predestination, this means that ballot and reprobation cannot exist viewed as a quantitative limitation of God'due south activity. Rather it must exist seen every bit its "qualitative definition".[58] As Christ bore the rejection every bit well as the election of God for all humanity, every person is subject to both aspects of God'southward double predestination.

Dialectic prominently figured in Bernard Lonergan's philosophy, in his books Insight and Method in Theology. Michael Shute wrote most Lonergan's use of dialectic in The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History. For Lonergan, dialectic is both private and operative in community. But described, it is a dynamic process that results in something new:

For the sake of greater precision, let u.s. say that a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1) at that place is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of ii principles, (iii) the principles are opposed however bound together, and (4) they are modified past the changes that successively result from them.[59]

Dialectic is one of the 8 functional specialties Lonergan envisaged for theology to bring this bailiwick into the modern globe. Lonergan believed that the lack of an agreed method among scholars had inhibited substantive agreement from being reached and progress from being made compared to the natural sciences. Karl Rahner, S.J., however, criticized Lonergan'southward theological method in a short commodity entitled "Some Critical Thoughts on 'Functional Specialties in Theology'" where he stated: "Lonergan'south theological methodology seems to me to exist so generic that it really fits every science, and hence is non the methodology of theology as such, but only a very general methodology of science."[60]

Criticisms [edit]

Karl Popper has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a newspaper entitled "What Is Dialectic?" in which he attacked the dialectical method for its willingness "to put upwards with contradictions".[61] Popper concluded the essay with these words: "The whole development of dialectic should be a alarm against the dangers inherent in philosophical system-building. It should remind u.s. that philosophy should not exist made a basis for whatever sort of scientific organisation and that philosophers should exist much more than small in their claims. 1 task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science" (Ibid., p. 335).

In affiliate 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society and Its Enemies (1944; 5th rev. ed., 1966), Popper unleashed a famous attack on Hegelian dialectics in which he held that Hegel's idea was to some caste responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism. (This was unjust in the view of some philosophers, such every bit Walter Kaufmann.[62]) In department 17 of his 1961 "addenda" to The Open Social club, entitled "Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism", Popper refused to moderate his criticism of the Hegelian dialectic, arguing that information technology "played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Deutschland [...] by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and correct, encouraged totalitarian modes of thought. [...] [And] undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty".[63]

The philosopher of scientific discipline and physicist Mario Bunge repeatedly criticized Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, calling them "fuzzy and remote from science"[64] and a "disastrous legacy".[65] He ended: "The so-called laws of dialectics, such as formulated by Engels (1940, 1954) and Lenin (1947, 1981), are false insofar as they are intelligible."[65]

Formalism [edit]

Since the late 20th century, European and American logicians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectic through formalisation,[66] : 201–372 although logic has been related to dialectic since aboriginal times.[66] : 51–140 In that location have been pre-formal and partially-formal treatises on statement and dialectic, from authors such every bit Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Argument, 1958),[67] [68] [66] : 203–256 Nicholas Rescher (Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Cognition, 1977),[69] [70] [66] : 330–336 and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (pragma-dialectics, 1980s).[66] : 517–614 One tin can include works of the communities of informal logic and paraconsistent logic.[66] : 373–424

Defeasibility [edit]

Building on theories of defeasible reasoning (see John L. Pollock), systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed assumptions, and rules for shifting burden.[66] : 615–675 Many of these logics appear in the special area of bogus intelligence and law, though the estimator scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build decision back up and computer-supported collaborative work systems.[71]

Dialog games [edit]

Dialectic itself can be formalised as moves in a game, where an advocate for the truth of a suggestion and an opponent argue.[ citation needed ] Such games can provide a semantics of logic, i that is very general in applicability.

Mathematics [edit]

Mathematician William Lawvere interpreted dialectics in the setting of categorical logic in terms of adjunctions betwixt idempotent monads.[72] This perspective may be useful in the context of theoretical information science where the duality betwixt syntax and semantics can exist interpreted as a dialectic in this sense. For case, the Curry-Howard equivalence is such an adjunction or more than generally the duality betwixt closed monoidal categories and their internal logic.[73]

Encounter also [edit]

  • Dialectical behavior therapy – Psychotherapy for emotional dysregulation
  • Dialectical research – Grade of qualitative research which utilizes the method of dialectic
  • Dialogic – Utilize of conversation to explore the significant of something
  • Doublethink – Simultaneously accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct
  • Simulated dilemma – Breezy fallacy involving falsely limited alternatives
  • Reflective equilibrium
  • Relational dialectics – Interpersonal communication theory
  • Tarka sastra
  • Unity of opposites – Central category of dialectics, said to be related to non-duality in a deep sense
  • Universal dialectic

References [edit]

  1. ^ see Gorgias, 449B: "Socrates: Would you be willing then, Gorgias, to go on the word as we are now doing [Dialectic], by manner of question and answer, and to put off to another occasion the (emotional) speeches [Rhetoric] that [the Sophist] Polus began?"
  2. ^ Corbett, Edward P. J.; Robert J. Connors (1999). Classical Rhetoric For the Mod Student (fourth ed.). New York: Oxford University Printing. pp. 1, 18. ISBN9780195115420.
  3. ^ Ayer, A. J., & O'Grady, J. (1992). A Dictionary of Philosophical Quotations. Oxford, Uk: Blackwell Publishers. p. 484.
  4. ^ McTaggart, J. M. E. (1964). A commentary on Hegel's logic. New York: Russell & Russell. p. xi
  5. ^ Diogenes Laërtius, IX 25ff and VIII 57 [1].
  6. ^ Critique of Pure Reason, A 61
  7. ^ "Elenchus - Wiktionary". viii Feb 2021.
  8. ^ Wyss, Peter (Oct 2014). "Socratic Method: Aporeia, Elenchus and Dialectics (Plato: Iv Dialogues, Handout 3)" (PDF). open.conted.ox.ac.great britain. University of Oxford, Department for Continuing Education.
  9. ^ Popper, K. (1962) The Open up Society and its Enemies, Volume 1, London, Routledge, p. 133.
  10. ^ Reale, Giovanni. (1990), History of Ancient Philosophy, 5 vols, trans. past John R. Catan, Albany: Country University of New York, vol ii, p. 150
  11. ^ Blackburn, Simon. 1996. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
  12. ^ Rapp (2010). Aristotle's Rhetoric. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/
  13. ^ Abelson, P. (1965). The seven liberal arts; a study in mediæval civilization. New York: Russell & Russell. Page 82.
  14. ^ Hyman, A., & Walsh, J. J. (1983). Philosophy in the Center Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish traditions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. Page 164.
  15. ^ Adler, Mortimer Jerome (2000). "Dialectic". Routledge. Page 4. ISBN 0-415-22550-7
  16. ^ Herbermann, C. Grand. (1913). The Cosmic encyclopedia: an international piece of work of reference on the constitution, doctrine, and history of the Catholic church. New York: The Encyclopedia press, inc. Folio 760–764.
  17. ^ From topic to tale: logic and narrativity in the Middle Ages, by Eugene Vance, p.43-45
  18. ^ "Catholic Encyclopedia: Peter Abelard". Newadvent.org. 1907-03-01. Retrieved 2011-xi-03 .
  19. ^ William of Sherwood'south Introduction to logic, past Norman Kretzmann, p.69-102
  20. ^ A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, by Peter Dronke, p.198
  21. ^ Medieval literary politics: shapes of credo, by Sheila Delany, p.xi
  22. ^ "Cosmic Encyclopedia: St. Thomas Aquinas". Newadvent.org. 1907-03-01. Retrieved 2015-x-twenty .
  23. ^ Nicholson, J. A. (1950). Philosophy of organized religion. New York: Ronald Printing Co. Page 108.
  24. ^ Kant, I., Guyer, P., & Wood, A. W. (2003). Critique of pure reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 495.
  25. ^ Henri Lefebvre'due south "humanist" dialectical materialism (Dialectical Materialism [1940]) was composed to direct challenge Joseph Stalin's own dogmatic text on dialectical materialism.
  26. ^ Historische Entwicklung der spekulativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, Dresden-Leipzig (1837), p. 367 of the fourth edition (1848).
  27. ^ The Accessible Hegel by Michael Allen Fox. Prometheus Books. 2005. p. 43. Also encounter Hegel's preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), secs. 50, 51, pp. 29, thirty.
  28. ^ See for a discussion of the historical development of the triad. Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln 4, Hegelian Dialectical Assay of U.Southward. Voting Laws, 42 U. Dayton 50. Rev. 87 (2017).
  29. ^ Hegel: A Reinterpretation, 1966, Anchor Books, p. 154)
  30. ^ G. E. Mueller (June 1958), "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antonym-Synthesis", 166ff
  31. ^ Hegel, Werke, ed. Glockner, Nineteen, 610
  32. ^ See 'La différance' in: Margins of Philosophy. Alan Bass, translator. University of Chicago Books. 1982. p. xix, fn 23.
  33. ^ Hegel. "Section in question from Hegel's Science of Logic". Marxists.org. Retrieved 2011-11-03 .
  34. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. 2nd Edition. London: Oxford University Press. Note to §81
  35. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. 2nd Edition. London: Oxford University Printing. §§107–111
  36. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. second Edition. London: Oxford Academy Printing. §§108–109
  37. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. 2d Edition. London: Oxford University Press. §108
  38. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. 2d Edition. London: Oxford University Press. §93
  39. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1874. The Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. second Edition. London: Oxford University Printing. §95
  40. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1812. Hegel's Science of Logic. London. Allen & Unwin. §§176–179.
  41. ^ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1812. Hegel'south Science of Logic. London. Allen & Unwin. §185.
  42. ^ Marx, Karl (1873) Capital Afterword to the 2nd German language Edition, Vol. I [two]
  43. ^ Marx, Karl. "Afterword (Second German language Ed.)". Upper-case letter. 1: 14. Retrieved 28 December 2014.
  44. ^ Engels, Frederick, (1877) Anti-Dühring, Office I: Philosophy, XIII. Dialectics. Negation of the Negation.
  45. ^ Engels, Frederick (1883). "Dialectics of Nature: Ii. Dialectics". Marxists.org . Retrieved 2011-xi-03 .
  46. ^ Marx, Karl, (1873) Upper-case letter Vol. I, Afterword to the Second German Edition.
  47. ^ a b Lenin, 5. I., On the Question of Dialectics: A Drove, pp. vii–9. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980.
  48. ^ Jean-Paul Sartre. "The Search for Method (1st part) Sartre, 1960, in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, transl. Hazel Barnes, Vintage Books". Marxists.org. Retrieved 2011-xi-03 .
  49. ^ Enquiry Section of the Universal House of Justice (August 2020). "Social Action". Baháʼí Reference Library. Coherence Between the Textile and Spiritual Dimensions of Existence. Retrieved 2020-08-30 .
  50. ^ Hatcher, William (September 1979). "Scientific discipline and the Baháʼí Faith". Zygon. fourteen (three): 229–53. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.1979.tb00359.x.
  51. ^ Smith, P. (1999). A Concise Encyclopedia of the Bahá'í Faith. Oxford, United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland: Oneworld Publications. pp. 306–07. ISBN978-1-85168-184-six.
  52. ^ Mehanian, Courosh; Friberg, Stephen R. (2003). "Religion and Evolution Reconciled: 'Abdu'l-Bahá'due south Comments on Evolution". The Journal of Baháʼí Studies. 13 (1–4): 55–93. doi:10.31581/JBS-13.1-iv.3(2003).
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  57. ^ See Church Dogmatics III/iii, xii.
  58. ^ Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (1933), p. 346
  59. ^ Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Nerveless Works vol. 3, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert Grand. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992, pp.217-218).
  60. ^ McShane, S.J., Philip (1972). Foundations of Theology. Notre Matriarch, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Printing. p. 194.
  61. ^ Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge [New York: Basic Books, 1962], p. 316.
  62. ^ Walter Kaufmann. "kaufmann". Marxists.org. Retrieved 2011-eleven-03 .
  63. ^ Karl Popper,The Open Social club and Its Enemies, 5th rev. ed., vol. ii [Princeton: Princeton University Printing, 1966], p. 395
  64. ^ Bunge, Mario Augusto (1981). "A critique of dialectics". Scientific materialism. Episteme. Vol. ix. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 41–63. doi:ten.1007/978-94-009-8517-9_4. ISBN978-9027713049. OCLC 7596139.
  65. ^ a b Bunge, Mario Augusto (2012). Evaluating philosophies. Boston studies in the philosophy of scientific discipline. Vol. 295. New York: Springer-Verlag. pp. 84–85. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4408-0. ISBN9789400744073. OCLC 806947226.
  66. ^ a b c d e f g
  67. ^ Toulmin, Stephen (2003) [1958]. The uses of argument (Updated ed.). Cambridge, U.k.; New York: Cambridge University Printing. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840005. ISBN978-0521827485. OCLC 51607421.
  68. ^ Hitchcock, David; Verheij, Bart, eds. (2006). Arguing on the Toulmin model: new essays in argument analysis and evaluation. Argumentation library. Vol. 10. Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag. doi:x.1007/978-ane-4020-4938-5. ISBN978-1402049378. OCLC 82229075.
  69. ^ Hetherington, Stephen (2006). "Nicholas Rescher: Philosophical Dialectics". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2006.07.16).
  70. ^ Jacquette, Dale, ed. (2009). Reason, Method, and Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. doi:10.1515/9783110329056. ISBN9783110329056.
  71. ^ For surveys of piece of work in this area come across, for instance: Chesñevar, Carlos Iván; Maguitman, Ana Gabriela; Loui, Ronald Prescott (Dec 2000). "Logical models of statement". ACM Calculating Surveys. 32 (4): 337–383. CiteSeerXten.ane.ane.702.8325. doi:ten.1145/371578.371581. And: Prakken, Henry; Vreeswijk, Gerard (2005). "Logics for defeasible argumentation". In Gabbay, Dov M.; Guenthner, Franz (eds.). Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 4 (2nd ed.). Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Bookish Publishers. pp. 219–318. CiteSeerX10.1.1.295.2649. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_3. ISBN9789048158775.
  72. ^ Lawvere, F. William (1996). "Unity and identity of opposites in calculus and physics". Applied Categorical Structures. 4 (ii–three): 167–174. doi:10.1007/BF00122250. S2CID 34109341.
  73. ^ Eilenberg, Samuel; Kelly, G. Max (1966). "Airtight Categories". Proceedings of the Briefing on Categorical Algebra: 421–562. doi:x.1007/978-3-642-99902-4_22. ISBN978-3-642-99904-eight.

Farther reading [edit]

  • McKeon, Richard (October 1954). "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action". Ideals. 65 (one): 1–33. doi:10.1086/290973. JSTOR 2378780. S2CID 144465113. The essay contains three parts: (1) a brief history of dialectic, designed to focus on these questions by tracing the evolution of various trends of dialectical method in the light of the development of alternative methods; (2) a statement of the nature and varieties of dialectic, designed to bring out differences of methods and to indicate the possibility of mutual conceptions and common aims; and (iii) an examination of the issues of mutual understanding and common action posed past the difference of dialectical and nondialectical methods of idea today.
  • Postan, Michael M. (April 1962). "Function and Dialectic in Economic History". The Economic History Review. 14 (iii): 397–407. doi:x.1111/j.1468-0289.1962.tb00058.x. JSTOR 2591884. The trouble about the dialectic is not that information technology is wholly inapplicable to history, but that information technology is so frequently applied to fields in which it happens to be least useful. If function and dialectic are to be reconciled and allowed their proper identify in historical piece of work, it volition possibly be necessary to move a stage beyond the philosophical position which Marx took upwardly in the 1840s. Having put the dialectic on its head, and fabricated information technology materialist, Marx has directed it into regions to which this posture is unsuited. If nosotros complete the somersault and put the dialectic on its feet over again, we might thereby return information technology to where information technology belongs.
  • Rescher, Nicholas (2007). Dialectics: A Classical Approach to Enquiry. Frankfurt; New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag. ISBN9783938793763. OCLC 185032382. A broad survey of diverse conceptions of "dialectic", including disputational, cerebral, methodological, ontological, and philosophical.
  • Spranzi, Marta (2011). The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric: The Aristotelian Tradition. Controversies. Vol. nine. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi:10.1075/cvs.9. ISBN9789027218896. OCLC 704557514. This book reconstructs the tradition of dialectic from Aristotle's Topics, its founding text, upwardly to its 'renaissance' in 16th century Italy, and focuses on the office of dialectic in the production of knowledge.

External links [edit]

  • 5:Dialectic algorithm – An algorithm based on the principles of classical dialectics
  • "Hegel'south Dialectics" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

larochepres1995.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic

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